Using a photo vault without Face ID
NullVault’s ordinary vault access uses a pattern on iPhone and Android. Each pattern selects a separate encrypted space. This provides a vault credential distinct from a Face ID check or the phone passcode; it does not remove authentication requirements imposed by the operating system or optional store services.
See pattern-locked vaults and phone lock versus vault lock. Protect the pattern from observation and keep the appropriate recovery material separately.
No credential type wins every scenario
Comparisons of lock types usually produce a ranking, which is the wrong output. Each type fails differently, and the right choice depends on which failure you are trying to avoid.
Model the scenarios separately — observation, theft of a locked device, someone who already knows the phone code, and coercion — and the answer stops being universal.
Biometrics: fast, with policy-dependent fallback
Face and fingerprint recognition are quick and resistant to shoulder-surfing, which makes them excellent against casual observation.
Where passcode fallback is allowed, biometric access inherits the passcode's strength and exposure. Biometric-only policies can block someone who knows that code, but they do not guarantee protection against coercion. Compelled biometric and passcode disclosure may also be treated differently by local law.
PINs: compact, memorable, and observable
A numeric PIN is easy to enter and easy to remember, which is also why it tends to be short and drawn from a small predictable set. Four digits is a space an attacker can exhaust quickly if rate limiting is absent or weak.
PIN entry is also highly observable. A single glance over a shoulder, or a camera in the room, captures it completely.
Patterns: larger space, but shaped by habit
A gesture pattern can encode more than a short PIN and, in a pattern-addressed design, can select which space opens rather than merely granting entry. NullVault maps each pattern to a different vault on iOS and Android without showing a master list.
The weakness is human: people favour straight lines, letter shapes, corners, and starting points near the top-left. A pattern is only as good as its unpredictability, and it leaves a longer visible trace during entry than a PIN does.
Choosing deliberately
- Model observation, device theft, a shared passcode, and coercion as separate cases.
- Use unrelated credentials for unrelated boundaries — never the phone code as the vault credential.
- Prefer length and unpredictability over cleverness; a memorable shape is often a guessable one.
- Test the fallback and the recovery path before relying on biometrics for anything important.
The two decisions that matter most
- Using a four-digit secret to protect high-value encrypted content.
- Reusing the phone's unlock code or pattern as the vault credential.
A fictional example
Sofia starts with a non-sensitive test: “Model observation, theft, shared passcode, and coercion separately.” Next, Sofia follows the second check: “Use unrelated credentials for unrelated boundaries.” This fictional scenario demonstrates the decision process; it is not a report of product testing.
Common mistakes
- Four-digit secrets for high-value encryption
- Reusing the phone code as the vault pattern
What this workflow does not change
- Four-digit secrets for high-value encryption
- Reusing the phone code as the vault pattern
Questions people ask
Why does NullVault use patterns?
On iOS and Android, each secure pattern addresses a different vault without a visible master list.